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The deleterious impact of institutions of direct legislation on student performance found in 
studies for both the U.S. and Switzerland has raised the question of what its transmission 
channels are. For the U.S., an increase in the ratio of administrative to instructional spending 
and larger class sizes were observed, supporting the hypothesis of a Leviathan-like school 
administration. For Switzerland, using a cross-sectional time-series panel of sub-federal 
school expenditure and size of classes, no such effect is detected. This finding is in line with 
previous analyses in which efficiency gains in the provision of public goods for Switzerland 
have been found. 
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In general, recent research on the impact of institutions of direct legislation on student 
performance both for the U.S. and Switzerland has revealed that student performance is 
negatively affected by it. An important transmission channel of this institutional impact 
appears to be the induced cut in educational spending, which directly translates into a 
performance lowering influence. However, for the U.S. there exists evidence that this 
budgetary impact might be (partly) caused by the manipulative behavior of school 
administrators: It could be shown that the cuts carried out by school administrators as a 
response to the (new) budget constraint were such that administrative spending was relatively 
less reduced than spending designated for instructional purposes. This paper is the first to test 
whether such a Leviathan-like behavior of school bureaucrats is also present in Switzerland. 
Since Swiss cantons are heterogeneous with respect to the degree of direct democracy and 
quite autonomous in their policies on public education, Switzerland – besides the U.S. – 
appears especially suitable for such an analysis. 
 
In anticipation of the empirical results, estimating a model of government expenditure direct 
democracy is first shown to considerably restrict the financial resources available for current 
expenses for public education in Swiss cantons for various types of institutions of education. 
Since the combined cantonal and local school expenses are the main source for financing 
public schooling in Switzerland, this limiting impact on the subfederal school budget can be 
considered crucial. In general, however, no such effect can be detected for investment 
expenditure. Subsequently, it is observed that if the ratio of instructional to administrative 
expenditure is employed as regressand in the identical model, the Leviathan-hypothesis has to 
be strongly rejected for both current and investment expenditure. A similar result is obtained 
for class sizes and student-teacher ratios. These findings are completely contrasting empirical 
results for the U.S., but they are in line with recent analyses of the institutional impact of 
direct legislation on student performance in Switzerland where it was conjectured that the 




The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the 
Swiss political and public educational system and presents related findings for the United 
                                                 
1 It is conjectured that lower educational spending is driven by lower teachers’ wages. 
  2States. The third section discusses the empirical model and the Leviathan-hypothesis while 
the forth describes the data and estimation method. Section 5 presents the estimation results. 
Finally, section 6 evaluates the findings and concludes.  
 
 
2  Context: Direct Democracy and Education Quality 
 
2.1 Direct  Democracy 
 
In modern (semi)direct democracies, a representative political system is complemented by 
direct democratic institutions. The most prominent cases are Switzerland and the United 
States, which are both also shaped by a very strong fiscal decentralization, each state level 
having its own sources of tax revenue. Therefore, there exists a direct institutional link 
between the power to tax and direct legislative institutions so that citizens are able to 
politically influence both sides of the budget equally. In Switzerland, popular rights can be 
exerted at all three levels of the state (federal, cantonal, and communal). Since the 26 Swiss 
cantons differ with respect to the degree of direct democracy which is determined by their 
state constitutions, it is possible to analyze the impact of a change in the degree of direct 
democracy on a particular policy outcome (FELD and KIRCHGÄSSNER 2001), like the provision 
of schooling.  
 
 
Table 1: Expenditure for Public Education in 2002 in Million Swiss Francs 
  All levels  Levels of the state 
      Federal government  Cantons  Communes 
   absolute  in %  absolute  in %  absolute  in %  absolute  in % 
Total costs of education       25,008.9  100.0  3,278.3  13.1  13,565.6  54.2  8,164.9  32.6 
            
Stage of education          
Kindergarten  916.0  3.7  -  -  303.3  33.1  612.7  66.9 
Compulsory education   10,944.5  43.8  19.4  0.2  4,374.1  40.0  6,551.0  59.9 
Schools with special 
curricula  1,098.9  4.4  -  -  488.2  44.4  610.6  55.6 
Professional schools  3,405.8  13.6  480.4  14.1  2,664.0  78.2  261.4  7.7 
High schools  1,994.7  8.0  11.7  0.6  1,917.9  96.2  65.0  3.3 
Advanced professional 
schools   247.6  1.0  31.6  12.8  214.4  86.6  1.5  0.6 
Universities, Universities 
of Applied Sciences   5,977.1  23.9  2,696.2  45.1  3,267.4  54.7  13.6  0.2 
Other costs of education  424.4  1.7  39.0  9.2  336.3  79.3  49.1  11.6 
Source: Federal Statistical Office, T 15.2.4.1 
  3In Switzerland, cantons are not only responsible for public education but bear the financial 
burden for its provision. Table 1 displays how the costs of public education at its various 
stages are split between the three levels of the Swiss State for the year 2002. To the overall 
costs of compulsory education, the federal government contributes only 0.2%, whereas the 
cantons bear about 40% and the communes about 60%. The communes mostly finance 
primary school education. Compulsory education finishes with the end of secondary I 
education, usually at the age of about 15. In general, in all 26 Swiss cantons, two types of 
secondary II education can be distinguished: basic education in professional schools and 
education to meet advanced requirements in high schools (e.g. university preparation). 
Usually, the second type can only be entered on a selective basis. Tertiary education takes 
place at universities, of which cantonal and federal universities exist, and advanced 
professional schools preparing for higher professional diploma. Finally, most of the cantons 
support also the ongoing education of adults.  
 
2.2 Theoretical  Background 
 
In some strands of political-economic theory it is argued that, in a representative system, 
resources are wasted and allocations of goods and resources occur that deviate strongly from 
the median voter's position. On the one hand, overspending is caused by (a) politicians who 
exploit the budget (and implicitly the tax base) to satisfy the needs of the electorate in their 
local districts ('pork-barrel legislation')
2; (b) the forming of broad coalition governments that 
leads to an inefficient expansion of budgets by the spending ministers ('budget as a common 
pool')
3; or (c) logrolling in the political decision-making process, which brings about the 




Most important, (d) government administrations are headed by bureaucrats who exercise 
monopoly power and aim at maximizing their budget and extracting rents (ROMER and 
ROSENTHAL 1978, 1979), which might lead to a preference for those expenditure projects that 
also cause an increase in administrative spending (e.g. through the foundation of new 
departments, etc.) (NISKANEN  1975). If the budget for governmental administrations is 
                                                 
2 According to WEINGAST, SHEPSLE and JOHNSEN (1981), this leads to a preference of projects in districts of the 
winning party at the expense of those of the loosing party. 
3 See e.g. ROUBINI and SACHS (1989), DE HAAN and STURM (1997), VOLKERINK and DE HAAN (2001). 
4 See also BESLEY and COATE (1997, 1998) on inefficiencies in representative democracies, particularly through 
allowing the politicians to pursue their own goals between elections and the activities of interest group. 
  4constrained, bureaucrats are thought to aim at increasing their personal administrative staff at 
the expense of the resources available for carrying out their duties related to production as 
prescribed by law (WILLIAMSON 1964).
5 When facing the decision to cut either administrative 
or instructional spending, a Leviathan-like administrator can be expected to choose the latter. 
Alternatively, FIGLIO and O’SULLIVAN (2001) propose a manipulative bureaucratic behavior 
in which the administrator deliberately allows student performances to decline by allocating 
fewer financial resources to instruction than to administration. The goal is to persuade the 
electorate that budget reductions have a deleterious impact on the quality of education so that 
it overrules its previous political decision. 
 
Nevertheless, direct democratic institutions, many of their supporters argue, might serve as 
means to discipline the behavior of politicians and bureaucrats (TEMPLE 1996). Using a model 
of political economy, FELD and KIRCHGÄSSNER (2001) show that the mere existence of such 
institutions (playing the role of a 'credible threat') leads to an allocation of good and resources 
that is closer to the median voter's preferences than otherwise. Therefore, three characteristics 
should be expected in direct democracies: (a) less money should be wasted on undesired 
projects because voters veto them through fiscal referenda and initiatives
6; (b) governmental 
budgets should be smaller because fewer financial projects and laws triggering new expenses 
are approved by the electorate if voters are fiscally conservative
7; and (c) public goods might 
be provided more efficiently as bureaucrats' discretionary power is also limited
8.  
 
2.3  U.S. Empirical Evidence on Public Schooling 
 
In the last two decades, so-called tax revolts – for example, California's famous Proposition 
13 in 1978 – have taken place in about 20 U.S. states
9, many of them pushed through by 
means of direct legislation, particularly statutory initiatives at the state level. These revolts 
aimed mostly at reducing the level and growth of property taxes that create important revenue 
at the local level (CARD and PAYNE 2002, DOWNES et al. 1998, DYE and MCGUIRE 1997), 
particularly for school budgets (BRADBURY et al. 2001, SHADBEGIAN 2003). But such a cut in 
                                                 
5 The rationale is that a large personal staff creates a feeling of importance and power (DOWNS 1967). 
6 For theoretical arguments, see e.g. BESLEY and COATE 2001. 
7 For theoretical arguments, see FELD and KIRCHGÄSSNER 2001.  
8 See e.g. POMMEREHNE 1983; see also KIRCHGÄSSNER (2000, 2001, 2002) and KIRCHGÄSSSNER et al. (1999) for 
a review of ample empirical evidence, FELD and SAVIOZ (1997) for a perspective on growth, and HUG (2004) 
for a corroborating meta-analysis. 
9 The source ACIR (1995) provides a catalogue of existing tax limits. 
  5school budget is not necessarily translated into an equally large cut (in relative terms) in the 
teaching and administration components of school spending (e.g. DYE and MCGUIRE 1997).  
 
During the 1990s, empirical multivariate analyses of the impact of newly introduced tax limits 
on student performance were carried out to test an educational production function, finding 
evidence for a performance lowering impact (e.g. FIGLIO 1997, DOWNES and FIGLIO 1997, 
DOWNES et al. 1998, FIGLIO and RUEBEN 2001). To identify the channels through which this 
deleterious impact occurred, the influence of these tax limits on various revenue-driven input 
factors of the educational production function has also been analyzed. Significant evidence 
was found that tax limits brought about less educational spending per student (BRADBURY et 
al. 2001, SHADBEGIAN 2003), and lower wages for beginning instructors (FIGLIO 1997, 
POTERBA and RUEBEN 1995)
10 that cause potentially well-qualified teachers to leave the 
profession (FIGLIO and RUEBEN 2001, FIGLIO 1997a). Furthermore, it was also shown that tax 
limits can be associated with larger class sizes and higher student-teacher ratios (SHADBEGIAN 
2003, FIGLIO 1998). Most important for this analysis, it was revealed that tax limits lead to a 
spending shift from instruction to administration (FIGLIO  1997, 1998). More precisely, 
administrators’ preferences were shown to have remained unchanged: they still overstaffed 
their administrations (DOWNES 1996), reduced instructional expenses relative to 
administrative expenses (FIGLIO 1998), or failed to reduce administrative spending at all 
(FIGLIO 1997). In addition, using expenditure data from 5,150 U.S. cities, FIGLIO and 
O’SULLIVAN (2001) observed a decrease of the teacher-administrator ratio in school districts 
with an override option. In sum, all these findings for the U.S. seem to provide evidence that 
the rent-seeking behavior of school bureaucrats is not limited by initiative-induced cuts in 
local school budgets. 
 
 
3  Model and Hypothesis 
 
In order to test the impact of direct democracy on the rent-seeking behavior of school 
bureaucrats in Switzerland, a two step strategy is followed. First, the components of public 
expenditure on education at public schools are analyzed as a function of the degree of direct 
democracy and other important determinants. Second, the impact of direct legislation on the 
                                                 
10 S HADBEGIAN (2003) found no significant effect of tax limits on teachers' average wages but provided no 
analysis of wages of starting teachers. In an older contribution, however, he showed that stringent tax limits 
had a decreasing effect on the wages of teachers (SHADBEGIAN 2000).  
  6Leviathan-like behavior of bureaucrats is investigated, measured by (a) the ratio of 
instructional spending to administrative spending and (b) class size. Thus, the following basic 
model is proposed: 
 IDit   =  β0  +  β1 DIRDEMit  +  β2Vit  +  uit (1) 
where IDit stands for the different dependent variables that are of interest in this study. The 
subscript i = 1, ..., 26 indicates cantons and t = 1990, ..., 2001 indexes years. The model 
implies that IDit is a function of direct democracy (DIRDEMit) and a vector of control 
variables Vit. β1 is the parameter of interest while uit denotes the error term.  
 
In previous empirical work by FELD and KIRCHGÄSSNER (1999, 2001), FELD and MATSUSAKA 
(2003, 2000), and VATTER and FREITAG (2002), a negative, spending limiting impact of direct 
democracy on sub-federal public spending was found. For total educational expenses in Swiss 
cantons, such a negative effect has been detected by FISCHER (2005) and SCHALTEGGER 
(2001), and similarly for the U.S. for the effect of (stringent) local tax limits on the local 
(school) budget by SHADBEGIAN (1999, 2003). Regarding the appropriation effort for the 
financing of higher education, ARCHIBALD and FELDMAN (2004) also found a considerable 
lowering impact at the U.S. state level. Based on these findings, it is here hypothesized that 
direct democracy should have a spending restraint impact on the various components of the 
subfederal budget for schooling in Switzerland.  
 
The impact of direct democracy on the adaptive behavior of school administrators to a budget 
constraint is, however, more ambiguous. Analogously to previous empirical findings for the 
U.S., a (relative) increase in administrative spending at the expense of means available for 
instruction, leading to larger class sizes and higher student-teacher ratios, should be expected; 
on the other hand, based on the relevant empirical literature for Switzerland it may well be 
that the efficiency gains in the provision of public goods observed by POMMEREHNE (1983) 
and conjectured by FELD  and SAVIOZ  (1997) prevail. But, based on the U.S. results, the 
expected sign of the direct democracy variable on the ratio coefficient should be negative.  
 
Vit  consists of variables capturing the structure of fiscal federalism such as fiscal 
decentralization measured by the share of local in total subfederal (i.e. cantonal and local) 
spending, tax competition measured by the inverse of the average of all other cantons income 
tax rates in the highest income tax bracket, weighted by the inverse of geographical distance 
  7between cantonal capitals, and unconditional grants which address the impact of vertical 
transfer payments from the federal government to cantonal governments. The more fiscally 
decentralized a canton the less leeway exists for diverging educational policies because of 
migration incentives. Similarly, the intensity of tax competition restricts educational 
expenditure at the cantonal level. Finally, unconditional grants help finance additional 
spending and relax cantonal budget constraints. 
 
Among the economic determinants, the log of national income disaggregated to the cantonal 
level is included according to the interpretation of WAGNER'S Law (1892) of a possible 
income effect on the demand for public goods such as public education. The log of population 
takes into account economies of scale: Larger cantons might be able to benefit from 
economies of scale reaching a lower level of public (educational) expenditures while 
achieving an identical level of supply.
11 In addition, a variable incorporating fiscal constraints 
at the cantonal level is included, which can be seen as a supplementary instrument to limit the 
taxing power of policymakers and hence their ability to finance public education 
(SCHALTEGGER 2002).  
 
In order to control for political factors, a coalition variable is employed in order to empirically 
evaluate the effect of broad based coalition governments on the exploitation of the budget as a 
fiscal commons by too many spending ministers (see section 2). Moreover, the 'net' share of 
conservative parties in the cantonal government is considered in order to control for the 
ideological disposition to finance public education. In line with the literature, we expect this 
variable to have a positive impact on educational expenditure, particularly for higher 
education.  
 
Finally, the share of persons holding a high school or university degree might exert an 
influence on the political decision-making process in favor of an increase in educational 
expenditure. The ratio of urban population in a canton reflects the impact of population 
density on fiscal policy decisions of governments. In agglomerations, a concentration of 
people demanding higher or more specialized education occurs often such that additional 
school spending has to be undertaken. Moreover, the shares of the young (below the age of 
20) and the senior population (above 60) in total population are controlled for in order to 
                                                 
11 The logarithm of the total population and logarithm of the various age groups who are supposed to attend 
specific institutions of education are correlated with rho = 0.99. 
  8reveal the influence of the two groups which (supposedly) most strongly benefit or disbenefit 
from schooling expenditure. Finally, a French-or-Italian-language dummy is included which 
takes into account systematic differences driven by cantonal culture. 
 
 
4 Data  and  Methodology 
 
At my disposal are budget data on sub-federal educational expenditure from 1990 to 2001.
12 
Among the various budget components, the following important ones have been selected for 
investigation: expenditure on pre-school education (Kindergarten), primary schools, and 
secondary I education. The last two institutions form the compulsory part of public education 
in Switzerland. Furthermore, also included is expenditure on secondary II institutions such as 
professional schools (Berufsbildungsschule) and high schools (whose degree allows entering a 
University,  Gymnasium), as well as institutions of tertiary education like advanced 
professional schools (Fachschulen), cantonal universities
13, and education of adults 
(Erwachsenenbildung). Most important, there is a budget component 'expenses for 
administration' which allows us to test the Leviathan-hypothesis developed above. For all 
these budget components, investment expenditure and current expenditure can be 
differentiated. In general, investment expenditure is related to the erection and renovation of 
facilities while current expenditure comprises expenses for the employment of personnel and 
the annual maintenance costs of the buildings.  
 
For this analysis, educational expenditure should be defined per student. The number of 
students is proxied by the absolute number of permanent residents in the specific age group 
by which usually a particular type of school is attended.
14 Since education is compulsory from 
the age of 6 until the age of 15, at least the per student numbers of primary and secondary I 
educational expenditure should be close to their true values. Absolute investment expenditure 
of 0 Swiss Francs has been replaced by a symbolic expenditure of 1 Swiss Franc. Based on 
these values of instructional and administrative spending, expenditure ratios have been 
calculated. In the expenditure regressions (levels), logs have been taken so that only 
                                                 
12 Since the costs of public education are split between the communes and the cantons the combined expenditure 
has to be employed as dependent variable.  
13 These are not financially borne by the federal government, in contrast to the so-called Federal Universities 
(Eidgenössische Hochschulen).  
14 These data are collected and made publicly available only from 1999 on.  
  9observations with positive spending levels remain in the sample.
15 All monetary variables 
have been deflated to the base year 1980. The budgetary, economic, and sociodemographic 
control variables were obtained from the Federal Statistical Office (BFS) (see also table A1 of 
the Appendix).  
 
Information on class sizes is available for some stages of public education from 1999 on. For 
this analysis, class sizes from 1999 until 2001 in primary schools, secondary I schools, and 
three types of institutions of secondary II education (Mittelschule and Gymnasium) could be 
obtained. Student-teacher ratios are difficult to calculate as the sole data on teachers available 
are for 1998. Based on these data, student-teacher ratios have been proxied for the years 1999 
and 2000.  
 
The estimations employ a composite index of direct democracy that measures the degree of 
direct legislation at the cantonal level in Switzerland (STUTZER 1999). This index takes on 
values between 1 and 6, with 6 indicating the highest degree of empowerment of the cantonal 
electorate. It is an unweighted average of four subindices that evaluate the power of the 
constitutional initiative, the statutory initiative, the fiscal referendum, and the statutory 
referendum in cantonal constitutions. Nevertheless, this index measures the presence of these 
institutions rather than their actual use
16. Its exact construction is demonstrated in STUTZER 
(1999) for the year 1996. A detailed description of all variables can be found in table A1 of 
the Appendix.  
 
The empirical analysis is performed using a pooled cross-section time-series model. FELD and 
KIRCHGÄSSNER (2001) argue that despite the panel structure of the data the inclusion of fixed 
effects in the cross-section domain is inappropriate because the institutional variables 
reflecting the extent of direct democracy vary only very little or remain constant over time in 
most cantons. Accordingly, cantonal intercepts do not make sense as the captured impact on 
fiscal outcomes is either solely driven by the time variation or, in case of time invariant 
variables, are likely to hide the effect of the institutional variables and render them 
insignificant. The consistency of OLS estimates depends on the exogeneity of the regressands. 
In this case, the decentralization variable is assumed to be exogenous as the single 
expenditure on a particular institution of education does not form a decisive part of the total 
                                                 
15 Only a very small number of observations is excluded by using this procedure. 
16 See FELD and KIRCHGÄSSNER (2001). 
  10cantonal spending, whereas the ideology of the elected government might be influenced by 
their educational policy. The endogenous variable has been instrumented with cantonal 
overnight stays per capita as a measure of tourist inflow and the birthrate of illegitimate 
children as a proxy for single parent families which account for important social determinants 
of voting left or right. For the major part of the regression models these variables appear to be 
valid instruments as indicated by the F-value of the excluded instruments of the first stage 
regression and the Hansen J-test of overidentification. In small samples, the Jarque-Bera test 
for normality is reported to indicate the presence of outliers. Finally, in all regressions year 
effects to circumvent time dependency are included and the heteroscedasticity and 






As already stated above, the analysis is carried out in two steps. First, the impact of direct 
democracy on educational expenditure per student will be investigated and, second, the 
Leviathan-hypothesis will be tested.  
 
5.1   Impact of Direct Democracy on Expenditure Levels 
 
Table 2 displays the results for current educational expenditure per student for various 
institutions of education. For the majority of the educational expenditure components, a 
significant spending dampening impact of direct democracy can be observed (at the 1 percent 
level). This occurs, in particular, for pre-school education (column (1)), secondary I education 
and secondary II education in professional schools (columns (3) and (4)), and education of 
adults (column (8)). Interestingly, sub-federal expenses for primary school (column (2)), high 
school and tertiary education are not significantly affected by institutions of direct legislation 
(columns (5) through (7)). Most important, also administrative spending, that is expenses for 
the cantonal and local school administrations, is significantly dampened through direct 
democracy (column (9)). The (centered) R2 indicates a quite good fit of the model, except for 
primary schools whose financing structure depends more on determinants at the local level. 
As regards the remaining controls, which are not in the main focus of this paper, the reader is 
advised to consult table 2. 
  11 
Table 2: Current Expenditure of Public Education per Student 1990 – 2001 

























democracy -0.329**  -0.001  -0.119** -0.074** 0.007 0.110 0.012 -0.337** -0.360**
 (4.10)  (0.03)  (3.92) (2.84) (0.20) (0.93) (0.18)  (2.73) (3.63)
Fiscal dec.  0.446  -0.105  -0.045 0.396* -0.465* 1.266* -0.432 0.302 -0.907
 (1.24)  (0.59)  (0.22) (2.47) (2.10) (2.28) (1.32)  (0.52) (1.52)
Tax comp.  -2.140**  -2.242**  -1.699** -0.515 -0.52 1.311 0.883 -1.135 -0.816
 (3.05)  (4.21)  (3.43) (1.40) (1.25) (0.92) (1.09)  (0.54) (0.60)
Fisc. constraint  0.057(*)  0.030(*)  -0.033(*) 0.025 0.067** -0.060 0.111**  -0.380** -0.104*
 (1.75)  (1.75)  (1.79) (1.50) (3.36) (0.59) (2.76)  (4.75) (2.09)
Coalition 0.337**  -0.023  -0.009 -0.081** -0.04 -0.365** -0.239** -0.051 -0.046
 (4.32)  (0.63)  (0.35) (3.03) (1.39) (3.36) (3.95)  (0.50) (0.48)
Ideology -1.548**  -1.204**  -0.405(*) -0.301 0.372(*) -0.976 -0.023 -0.265 -1.977**
 (4.03)  (4.95)  (1.80) (1.49) (1.86) (0.69) (0.05)  (0.30) (3.04)
Transfers -0.590**  0.189*  -0.167* 0.059 0.07 -0.102 -0.044  0.313 -0.030
  (3.57) (2.46)  (2.30) (0.90) (1.07) (0.35) (0.30)  (0.99) (0.12)
High edu.  0.108**  0.017  0.003 0.044** 0.009 0.031 0.112**  0.062 0.064*
 (4.36)  (1.51)  (0.38) (6.16) (1.20) (1.13) (6.26)  (1.56) (2.36)
Urbanization -0.014**  -0.004(*) -0.002 -0.007** 0.003 -0.014(*) -0.006 -0.007 -0.014(*)
 (3.46)  (1.85)  (1.43) (4.23) (1.54) (1.86) (1.25)  (0.86) (1.69)
Income -1.108*  -0.811**  0.415(*) 0.103 0.171 0.93 1.059*  -1.676 -1.095
 (2.34)  (3.42)  (1.96) (0.58) (0.81) (1.19) (2.58)  (1.56) (1.58)
Population -0.427**  0.036  -0.013 0.088** -0.128** 0.264** 0.265** -0.021 -0.309**
 (4.74)  (0.96)  (0.53) (3.25) (3.92) (2.74) (4.12)  (0.14) (3.08)
Res. > 60  -0.049  -0.058**  0.006 -0.004 -0.021 -0.043 0.147** -0.023 -0.057
 (1.42)  (2.68)  (0.36) (0.23) (0.96) (0.71) (3.64)  (0.29) (0.82)
Res. < 20   -0.152**  -0.059*  -0.027(*) -0.090** -0.083** -0.168* -0.016 -0.231* -0.261**
 (3.60)  (2.30)  (1.67) (4.40) (3.20) (2.14) (0.32)  (2.59) (2.75)
Latin -1.737**  -0.619**  0.044 -0.192 -0.158 0.494 0.357 -1.229(*) -1.358**
 (4.67)  (3.22)  (0.32) (1.40) (1.01) (0.88) (1.23)  (1.88) (2.78)
Constant 23.920**  13.014**  9.376** 8.744** 10.689** 5.285 -3.068 12.77 21.382**
  (5.69) (5.84)  (6.40) (5.12) (5.24) (0.85) (0.75)  (1.53) (3.14)
Obs. 312  312  312 312 312 312 303  298 312
Centered R2  0.6329  -0.1470  0.752 0.8226 0.5967 0.4479 0.8293  0.4500 0.4596
F-test (instr.)  58.86  58.86  58.86 58.86 58.86 58.86 53.03  62.98 58.86
Partial R2  0.2604  0.2604  0.2604 0.2604 0.2604 0.2604 0.2515  0.3053 0.2604
Hansen J  0.060  0.000  0.796 2.810 0.000 0.958 0.721  1.202 1.028
(p-value) (0.807)  (0.992)  (0.373) (0.094) (0.990) (0.328) (0.396) (0.273) (0.311)
2SLS with autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity robust standard errors; absolute values of t-statistics are given in brackets. 
Endogenous variable: ideology of government instrumented with measures of tourist inflow and broken families, both lagged by 
two periods. **, * and (*) indicate significances at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. J.-B is the Jarque-
Bera statistics, Hansen J the Hansen's J statistics which is distributed chi-squared in the number of overidentifying restrictions. 
 
 
The size of the coefficient on direct democracy in the administrative spending regression 
(column (9)) appears quantitatively bigger than the ones observed in the relevant spending 
regressions for instructional purposes (columns (1), (3), (4), and (8)). Based on these 
estimation outcomes it might well be that a higher level of direct democracy is associated 
  12with a relatively bigger cut in administrative spending than in instructional spending. Thus, 
for current educational spending in Switzerland, a rejection of the Leviathan-bureaucracy-
hypothesis seems to be likely.  
 
 
Table 3: Investment Expenditure for Public Education per Student 1990 – 2001 
  1  2  3 4 5 6 7  8  9 























Democracy  1.489* -2.188* -0.911 0.497 1.195* 1.400* -2.687** -1.221* -1.045
 (2.26)  (2.52)  (1.10) (1.02) (2.16) (2.05) (3.49)  (2.41) (1.01)
Fiscal dec.  3.471  -7.382(*)  -5.242 -0.612 1.951 -3.34 -0.111 -1.93 -1.443
 (1.05)  (1.84)  (1.52) (0.22) (0.76) (1.19) (0.04)  (0.98) (0.28)
Tax comp.  -13.845  -24.391*  12.773 28.360** 20.169* -15.535(*) 2.067  -15.161** -1.491
 (1.41)  (1.99)  (1.24) (3.09) (2.27) (1.84) (0.23)  (3.06) (0.11)
Fisc. constraint  0.913*  -0.576  -1.345* -0.431 -0.556(*) 0.671 0.324 -0.562* -0.082
 (2.05)  (1.03)  (2.57) (1.01) (1.73) (1.22) (0.61)  (2.27) (0.12)
Coalition 0.635  1.635*  1.337(*) 0.042 1.491** -1.171(*) -0.195  -1.024** -0.66
 (0.92)  (2.16)  (1.78) (0.08) (2.87) (1.66) (0.28)  (3.14) (0.78)
Ideology -3.136  -19.131**  -7.870(*) 11.630** -0.662 -2.708 -4.915 -7.338** -9.121
 (0.68)  (3.76)  (1.72) (2.75) (0.12) (0.47) (1.10)  (2.99) (1.54)
Transfers 2.606  -0.247  2.083 4.183** 0.967 3.749* 0.229  0.255 2.156
  (1.55) (0.13)  (1.33) (3.23) (0.71) (2.43) (0.16) (0.26) (0.99)
High edu.  0.167  -0.061  0.126 -0.145 -0.168 -0.036 0.413*  0.427** 0.056
 (0.96)  (0.32)  (0.70) (0.90) (1.44) (0.23) (2.05)  (3.88) (0.25)
Urbanization -0.026  -0.047  -0.041 0.047 0.096** -0.042 -0.015 -0.090** -0.029
 (0.60)  (1.08)  (1.10) (1.20) (2.97) (1.01) (0.36)  (3.32) (0.47)
Income -6.33  -11.964*  -9.125(*) 5.869 -1.846 -0.97 3.332  -5.434* -3.261
 (1.35)  (1.99)  (1.71) (1.39) (0.49) (0.18) (0.76)  (2.27) (0.56)
Population 1.684** 0.26  1.802* 2.298** 1.865** 3.604** 1.975**  -0.158 -0.313
 (2.74)  (0.32)  (2.27) (4.63) (3.46) (5.96) (3.00)  (0.37) (0.33)
Res. > 60  -0.137  -0.35  0.307 0.197 0.477 -0.539 1.313**  -0.380(*) -0.344
 (0.34)  (0.75)  (0.66) (0.59) (1.41) (1.35) (3.75)  (1.85) (0.61)
Res. < 20   -0.809(*)  -0.687  -0.019 0.024 0.806* -1.032* 0.716(*) -0.474* -1.005
 (1.74)  (1.26)  (0.04) (0.06) (2.16) (2.23) (1.77)  (2.06) (1.60)
Latin -3.715  -5.337  1.488 7.589** 5.797* 1.119 -2.595 -7.819** -1.957
 (1.16)  (1.23)  (0.38) (2.92) (1.98) (0.31) (0.96)  (3.48) (0.45)
Constant 5.386  79.639(*)  -10.619 -80.331* -69.856* -20.002 -78.121*  41.773* 39.477
  (0.14) (1.68)  (0.23) (2.35) (2.03) (0.49) (2.20) (2.14) (0.73)
Obs. 312  312  311 302 308 300 306  310 300
Centered R2  0.2767  0.3433  0.444 0.3673 0.3341 0.4459 0.5923  0.0946 0.1581
F-test (instr.)  58.86  58.86  59.04 55.14 58.63 59.10 60.49  58.79 51.99
Partial R2  0.2604  0.2604  0.2615 0.2573 0.2590 0.2688 0.2632  0.2614 0.2823
Hansen J  2.086  0.340  1.392 0.449 1.317 0.869 0.124  3.734 0.006
(p-value) (0.149)  (0.560)  (0.238) (0.503) (0.251) (0.351) (0.725) (0.053) (0.940)
See table 2. 
 
 
The estimation results for investment spending are displayed in table 3. In columns (1) 
through (8) investment for the purpose of instruction is employed as dependent variable while 
  13investment for school administration is the regressand in column (9). The estimation 
outcomes show that investment spending is considerably restrained by institutions of direct 
democracy for universities run by the canton, for adult education, and for primary schools 
(columns (2), (7) and (8)). Non-recurring expenses on pre-school, secondary II education in 
high schools and tertiary education in professional schools (columns (1), (5) and (6)) are 
unexpectedly higher in more direct democratic cantons than in more representative 
democratic ones. Investments in school administration do not appear to be affected at all 
(column (9)). Given that the impact of direct democracy on administrative investment 
spending does not appear decisive, it is difficult to make a prediction about how that ratio of 
instructional to administrative investment spending might be influenced. This question will be 
investigated in the next section.  
 
5. 2   Testing the Efficiency of School Provision 
 
The Leviathan-hypothesis is tested through analyzing the determinants of the ratio of the 
spending designated for teaching to the one for administrative purposes, for current as well as 
investment expenditure. The hypothesis of a Leviathan-like school administration could not 
be rejected if the cut in instructional expenditure were larger than the cut in administrative 
expenditure, so that the ratio would appear negatively affected by institutions of direct 
legislation.  
 
Table 4 shows the estimation results for the ratio of current schooling expenditure for various 
types of institutions of education, defined as the current expense for instruction for a 
particular institution of education divided by total current expenditure for school 
administration. Hence, in all regression models the denominator of the dependent variable is 
identical.
17 The estimation results show that for almost all types of institutions of education 
the Leviathan-hypothesis can be rejected: In Switzerland, in more direct democratic cantons 
cuts in administrative expenditure appear to be significantly larger than cuts in instructional 
expenditure than in more representative democratic cantons. This observation is true for all 
positive estimates of direct legislation reported in columns (1) through (7). Significance levels 
of the coefficients vary between the 10 percent and 1 percent levels. Thus, for most of the 
stages of public education under investigation, in fact, even an efficiency increasing influence 
of direct democracy appears to be present. A contrasting result can be observed for spending 
on education of adults, however, on which a significant ratio-decreasing influence of direct 
                                                 
17 The data do not allow splitting administrative expenses according to level or institutions of education.  
  14democracy is revealed (column (8)). The negative coefficient indicates that the cut in 
expenses for instruction is relatively bigger than the cut in administrative spending 
(significant at the 5 percent level). In sum, except this very last regression for adult education, 
the Leviathan-hypothesis cannot be supported by the Swiss data. 
 
 
Table 4: Ratio of Instructional to Administrative Current Expenditure 1990 - 2001 























Democracy  0.920(*) 8.253**  4.876* 4.157** 4.558** 1.276** 1.590** -0.044*
  (1.74) (2.95) (2.34) (2.60) (3.01) (3.49) (2.67) (1.98)
Fiscal dec.  0.041  -32.953(*)  -12.318 3.517 -4.861 0.998  -0.252 0.104
  (0.02) (1.68 (1.16) (0.55) (0.74) (0.79) (0.07) (1.05)
Tax comp.  -6.548  -141.088*  -30.024 6.833 -8.914 5.919  9.25 0.392
  (1.13) (2.16) (0.91) (0.37) (0.45) (1.29) (1.15) (1.40)
Fisc. constraint  0.596(*)  4.850**  1.669 2.568* 2.822** 0.277  0.836* -0.038**
  (1.87) (3.29) (1.47) (2.56) (2.92) (1.15) (2.30) (3.23)
Coalition 0.846  -0.127  -0.093 -1.267 -0.772 -0.381 -0.108 -0.014
  (1.61) (0.04) (0.04) (0.94) (0.56) (1.12) (0.18) (0.77)
Ideology  5.955  10.29 39.244* 40.500** 42.164** 5.932* 10.992* 0.338*
  (1.58) (0.40) (2.51) (3.17) (3.33) (2.19) (2.57) (2.43)
Transfers -1.586  8.725  -0.19 3.351 5.236 0.768  -0.323 0.057
  (1.14) (1.15) (0.04) (0.98) (1.54) (0.78) (0.25) (1.24)
High edu.  -0.18  -0.78  -1.145* -0.469 -0.456 -0.164*  0.159 0.000
  (1.44) (1.09) (2.10) (1.35) (1.31) (2.41) (1.08) (0.07)
Urbanization 0.000  0.383  0.259(*) 0.082 0.172(*) 0.028  0.05 0.001
  (0.00) (1.59) (1.72) (0.86) (1.77) (1.24) (1.35) (1.12)
Income 7.189(*)  5.778  36.271** 22.423** 16.802* 5.248* 11.953** -0.310*
  (1.92) (0.25) (2.61) (2.80) (1.99) (2.10) (3.33) (2.16)
Population  0.364  6.267* 5.066** 4.456** 1.733 1.518** 2.733** -0.01
  (0.70) (2.55) (2.67) (3.36) (1.30) (5.16) (5.41) (0.37)
Res. > 60  0.218  2.261  2.772* 1.061 0.924 0.315  1.120** -0.011
  (0.73) (1.11) (2.03) (1.23) (1.12) (1.44) (3.31) (0.87)
Res. < 20   0.419  7.567*  5.239** 1.557 1.610 0.463(*)  1.329** -0.024
  (1.12) (2.43) (2.88) (1.58) (1.58) (1.67) (3.32) (1.49)
Latin 2.527  -5.066  23.664* 17.493* 12.266(*) 5.138** 9.618** -0.043
  (1.03) (0.28) (2.05) (2.39) (1.67) (2.73) (3.37) (0.50)
Constant  -32.984  -357.161* -362.698** -208.912** -171.419* -62.194** -137.131** 1.869
  (1.06) (2.07) (2.91) (2.69) (2.28) (2.93) (4.37) (1.34)
Obs.  312 312 312 312 312 312 312 312
Centered  R2  0.2597  0.354 0.2152 0.137 0.1661 0.2416 0.4019 0.2463
F-test  (instr.)  58.86 58.86 58.86 58.86 58.86 58.86 58.86 58.86
Partial  R2  0.2604 0.2604 0.2604 0.2604 0.2604 0.2604 0.2604 0.2604
Hansen  J  0.003 1.034 0.027 0.237 0.027 0.054 1.054 1.491
(p-value) (0.956)  (0.309)  (0.869) (0.626) (0.871) (0.817) (0.305) (0.222)
See table 2 
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Table 5: Ratio of Instructional to Administrative Investment Expenditure 1990 
  1 2 3 4  5  6  7 8 





















Democracy  -23,182 -616,295  -122,243 707,648 -8,185 372,836*  468,825 -144
 (0.18)  (1.07)  (0.50) (1.57) (0.03) (2.36)  (1.10) (0.77)
Fiscal dec.  1,071,675  3,944,235  2,490,631 2,794,612 2,207,744(*) 676,555  11,369,127** -1,916
 (1.55)  (1.42)  (1.36) (1.54) (1.83) (1.29)  (2.64) (0.58)
Tax comp.  -2,321,933  843,930  2,273,541 8,659,162 115,018 768,146  10,366,332 -2,246
 (1.61)  (0.12)  (0.67) (1.45) (0.03) (0.50)  (1.57) (0.81)
Fisc. constraint  80,072  -435,157  -385,945* -352,165 -267,807(*) 9,709  -667,263* 123
 (0.97)  (1.14)  (2.35) (1.17) (1.69) (0.12)  (2.42) (0.70)
Coalition 450,295*  1,743,797*  989,035* 1,185,134* 944,120** 93,464  1,488,084(*) -578
 (2.57)  (2.30)  (2.19) (2.20) (2.99) (0.79)  (1.76) (0.64)
Ideology -670,458  -1,323,540  -465,439 7,870,978* 419,336 1,726,525(*)  5,190,864 -1,679
 (0.98  (0.39)  (0.31) (2.38) (0.23) (1.68)  (1.61) (1.00)
Transfers -391,543  -352,939  413,049 -172,961 -858,311 77,737  1,021,149 -557
  (1.31) (0.30)  (0.63) (0.13) (1.39) (0.35) (0.82) (0.49)
High edu.  -13,214  -37,957  -50,546 26,969 -68,906 21,511  -105,719 57
 (0.49)  (0.36)  (0.94) (0.27) (1.42) (0.94)  (1.03) (0.86)
Urbanization 5,283  29,121  17,483 59,823* 29,920* 4,139  65,705(*) -33
 (0.70)  (0.93)  (1.08) (2.26) (2.11) (0.72)  (1.90) (1.02)
Income -953,136  -1,893,956  -907,234 3,756,368 858,786 95,490  4,813,125 -531
 (1.32)  (0.53)  (0.49) (0.89) (0.49) (0.14)  (1.58) (0.25)
Population 121,318  516,098  398,253 759,652 482,791* 246,866*  1,131,884* -324
 (1.12)  (0.91)  (1.41) (1.53) (2.08) (2.27)  (2.35) (1.05)
Res. > 60  -87,000  92,933  69,923 616,854(*) 108,483 -8,319  699,579* -249
 (1.59)  (0.28)  (0.43) (1.71) (0.66) (0.10)  (2.34) (1.22)
Res. < 20   13,846  411,931  170,939 960,492* 458,795* 9,850  669,080(*) -316
 (0.23)  (1.09)  (0.92) (2.22) (2.39) (0.18)  (1.88) (1.27)
Latin -1,085,827*  -1,219,274  58,215 5,122,642(*) 131,317 678,506  3,499,519 -687
 (2.06)  (0.40)  (0.04) (1.70) (0.09) (1.51)  (1.52) (0.54)
Constant 4,726,225  -1.14e+07  -1.25e+07 -7.08e+07* -2.12e+07 -6,623,167  -8.05e+07** 27,879
  (0.84) (0.33)  (0.76) (2.01) (1.35) (1.27) (2.65) (1.28)
Obs. 312  312  312 312 312 312  312 312
Centered R2  0.2957  0.1817  0.1822 0.1569 0.2619 0.1229  0.2252 0.0447
F-test (instr.)  58.86  58.86  58.86 58.86 58.86 58.86  58.86 58.86
Partial R2  0.2604  0.2604  0.2604 0.2604 0.2604 0.2604  0.2604 0.2604
Hansen J  0.976  1.988  2.836 5.820 2.588 1.048  3.467 0.986
(p-value) (0.323)  (0.156)  (0.092) (0.016) (0.108) (0.306) (0.063) (0.321)
See table 2 
 
 
The investment expenditure ratio is employed as regressand in table 5. Again, the 
denominator of the dependent variable, total investments in school administration, is identical 
for all regressions while the numerator measures the investment expenditure for the various 
institutions of education. For almost all stages of education the coefficient of direct 
democracy appears to be insignificant, which means that this ratio is not affected by the 
  16degree of cantonal direct democracy. For advanced professional education, however, even a 
positive impact of direct legislation can be observed (column (6)), indicating a relative rise in 
instructional expenses. To sum up, again, regarding investment expenditure on public 
education, the Leviathan-hypothesis has to be strongly rejected.  
 
5. 3   Impact of Direct Democracy on Class Size 
 
Another important transmission channel of a deleterious impact of direct democracy on 
educational performance might be the class size and/or the student-teacher ratio. Table 6 
reports the estimation results for Swiss class sizes in primary schools, secondary I schools, 
and three types of secondary II schools (columns (1) through (5)), as well as for student-
teacher ratios for the compulsory stages of public education and in professional secondary II 
schools (columns (6) and (7)).  
 
The finding is that direct democracy does not significantly impact class sizes in the 
institutions of public education under investigation, except the two types of middle schools (at 
the 5 percent level) in columns (3) and (4). But an exclusion of outliers in table 7, indicated 
by the Jarque-Bera test for normality of the residuals, yields that class sizes in secondary I 
schools are even smaller in more direct democratic cantons than otherwise (table 7 column 
(5)). The estimate lets suggest that a one point increase in the index of direct democracy leads 
to a reduction in class size by 0.3 students. For the middle schools, however, the coefficients 
in table 6 indicate that an increase in the composite index of direct legislation by one point 
increases class size on average by about 1.5 and 1.3 students, respectively. The reader should 
note, however, that the chosen instruments do not perform well for these two regression 
models and that the number of observations is by far smaller than the one for the other three 
school types. Table 7 reports estimation results for the class sizes in the two middle schools 
employing a different set of instruments and also using OLS. Obviously, the class size 
increasing impact of direct democracy is only supported for middle schools with a focus on 
trade and business (columns (3) and (4)), but not for the other type (columns (1) and (2)). In 
columns (3) and (4), the coefficient on direct democracy is lower in magnitude than the one 
reported in table 6 and indicates that a rise by one point is associated with one more student in 
class. The maximum increase in class size is then by 5 students caused by a jump of the index 
from 1 (minimum) to 6 points (maximum).  
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Table 6: Educational Inputs 
 
Class size  
1999 – 2002 
Student-teacher ratio 
1999 - 2000 
























Democracy -0.008 -0.006  1.450* 1.267* -0.038 0.436(*)  -0.444
 (0.04) (0.02)  (2.02) (2.12) (0.13) (1.76)  (0.28)
Fiscal dec.  3.608* 5.573*  -0.37 12.585 1.797 -6.435*  4.136
 (2.47) (2.44)  (0.07) (1.56) (0.76) (2.22)  (0.29)
Tax comp.  -0.909 3.107  27.511* 21.125 -0.121 -6.001  0.471
 (0.46) (1.15)  (2.20) (1.28) (0.04) (1.58)  (0.03)
Fisc. 
constraint -0.015 -0.459*  0.916(*) 0.111 -0.156 0.021 -0.113
 (0.08) (2.48)  (1.99) (0.34) (0.81) (0.12)  (0.08)
Coalition 0.258 0.546  0.003 -1.445 0.005 0.181 1.755
 (0.70) (1.14)  (0.00) (1.29) (0.01) (0.55)  (0.59)
Ideology -0.774 -3.714  11.869 10.509 1.611 -0.759 6.876
 (0.31) (1.64)  (1.37) (0.88) (0.63) (0.37)  (0.42)
Transfers 0.04 0.554  2.049 0.924 -0.342 -0.28  2.045
 (0.13) (1.52)  (1.55) (0.77) (0.72) (0.44)  (0.75)
High edu.  -0.034 -0.109  -0.238 -0.002 -0.217** 0.027 -0.059
 (0.59) (1.39)  (1.33) (0.02) (2.73) (0.51)  (0.14)
Urbanization 0.044** 0.047**  0.059 0.069** 0.034** 0.028  0.159
 (6.99) (4.81)  (1.17) (3.02) (3.63) (1.57)  (1.60)
Income -1.503 -5.293*  7.213 7.118 3.655(*) -0.502  -2.465
 (0.93) (2.24)  (1.46) (0.69) (1.85) (0.20)  (0.16)
Population 0.439* 0.724**  2.428** 2.709* 1.028** 0.482(*)  2.024
 (2.60) (3.80)  (4.45) (2.20) (4.16) (1.84)  (1.45)
Res. > 60  0.136 0.125  0.532 0.963 0.12 0.333*  1.679(*)
 (1.59) (0.81)  (1.06) (1.66) (0.83) (2.61)  (1.78)
Res. < 20   0.520** 0.391*  0.034 1.18 0.446** 0.885**  4.451**
 (7.36) (2.62)  (0.06) (1.54) (3.71) (5.03)  (3.09)
Latin -0.868 -0.1  9.986* 7.841 2.209(*) 0.423  -10.367
 (0.83) (0.08)  (2.53) (1.19) (1.98) (0.38)  (1.56)
Constant -0.224 5.867  -67.548(*) -105.008 -14.104 -13.493  -142.972*
 (0.02) (0.40)  (1.68) (1.25) (1.15) (1.16)  (2.13)
Obs. 104 104  80 72 104 52  50
Centered R2  0.600 0.5489  0.4604 0.5022 0.4712 0.7597  0.7979
J.-B.   3.039 10.5  1.623 0.6076 0.6379 11.3  1.77
(p-value) (0.22) (0.01)  (0.44) (0.74) (0.73) (0.00) (0.41)
F-test (instr.)  11.53 11.53  3.49 2.95 11.53 9.13  13.60
Partial R2  0.2201 0.201  0.1304 0.0895 0.2201 0.2705  0.3468
Hansen J  0.669 0.891  0.046 0.007 2.472 0.154  0.503
(p-value) (0.413) (0.345)  (0.830) (0.931) (0.116) (0.695) (0.478)
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Table 7: Educational Inputs: Special Cases 
  Class Size  Student-
teacher ratio 












  2SLS  OLS  2SLS  OLS  Outliers excl.  Outliers excl.
Direct 
Democracy 0.495  0.462 1.069* 1.069* -0.322(*)  0.559*
 (0.98)  (0.95) (2.17) (2.21) (1.84)  (2.72)
Fiscal dec.  0.433  0.461 8.043* 8.052* 9.795**  -3.400(*)
 (0.11)  (0.11) (2.07) (2.13) (7.55)  (1.93)
Tax comp.  16.658*  16.280* 10.471(*) 10.491(*) 4.385* -7.509*
 (2.35)  (2.53) (1.78) (1.83) (2.38)  (2.26)
Fisc. constraint  0.172  0.146 0.137 0.137 -0.628**  0.074
 (0.49)  (0.41) (0.50) (0.50) (5.10)  (0.49)
Coalition 1.774**  1.836** -0.639 -0.64 0.871*  0.296
 (2.90)  (3.44) (1.44) (1.65) (2.64)  (0.95)
Ideology -2.300  -2.795 1.803 1.819 (4.944**  (1.161
 (0.61)  (1.00) (0.54) (0.70) (3.15)  (0.61)
Transfers 1.764(*)  1.754(*) 0.277 0.278 0.248  0.065
 (1.84)  (1.82) (0.35) (0.34) (0.72)  (0.12)
High edu.  -0.423**  -0.430** 0.034 0.034 -0.233**  0.019
 (3.61)  (3.70) (0.36) (0.36) (4.03)  (0.34)
Urbanization -0.001  -0.003 0.059** 0.059** 0.037**  0.043**
 (0.04)  (0.12) (3.65) (3.71) (3.59)  (4.03)
Income -0.921  -1.205 -0.704 -0.69 -6.228**  -2.663
 (0.25)  (0.32) (0.18) (0.21) (3.50)  (1.41)
Population 2.366**  2.364** 1.846** 1.847** 0.567**  0.345
 (5.68)  (5.62) (3.06) (3.16) (3.87)  (1.65)
Res. > 60  -0.314  -0.344 0.584* 0.585* -0.081  0.296**
 (1.11)  (1.25) (2.05) (2.15) (0.75)  (3.39)
Res. < 20   -0.898*  -0.931** 0.654(*) 0.655* 0.152  0.925**
 (2.45)  (2.84) (1.96) (2.13) (1.24)  (9.95)
Latin 3.705(*)  3.486* 2.977 2.986 -0.593  0.288
 (1.81)  (2.03) (1.31) (1.55) (0.73)  (0.29)
Constant 4.635  7.155 -43.017 -43.132 22.102*  -10.73
 (0.19)  (0.31) (1.42) (1.59) (2.13)  (1.34)
Obs. 80  80 72 72 99  50
Centered R2  0.6745  0.6747 0.5993 0.5993 0.7196  0.8836
J.-B.   0.569  0.509 3.434 3.425 2.622  1.915
(p-value) (0.75)  (0.77) (0.18) (0.18) (0.27)  (0.38)
F-test (instr.)  16.98  -  24.58 -  10.60  8.68
Partial R2  0.4469  -  0.5483 -  0.2120  0.2734
Hansen J  4.355  -  3.396 -  0.548  1.411
(p-value) (0.113)  -  (0.183) -  (0.459)  (0.235)
See table 2. Ideology of government is instrumented with the cantonal unemployment rate, the cantonal theft 
rate, and the share of seasonal workers in regressions (1) and (3). All instruments are lagged by two periods. 
 
 
  19As regards the student-teacher ratio, table 6 shows for the compulsory part of education a 
weak ratio increasing impact of direct legislation (at the 10 percent level), which is not the 
case for (non-compulsory) secondary II education at professional schools (columns (6) and 
(7)). Results for compulsory education when outliers are excluded are reported in table 7. 
Here the significance level of the positive coefficient on direct democracy rises to the 5 
percent level (column (6)), indicating that more students have to be taken care of by one 
teacher in more direct democratic cantons. The size of the coefficient, however, is quite small 
as an increase in the index by two points lets the student-teacher ratio rise by only about one 
student per teacher. Hence, the maximum increase in the relative number of students is 2.5. 
These findings for the student-teacher ratio, however, have to be taken with caution as the 
underlying data are only proxies and student-teacher ratios measure something different from 
class size.  
 
Since the positive institutional influence on student-teacher ratios occurs only for very few 
school types and is then quantitatively small compared to e.g. the impact of fiscal 
decentralization or tax competition, the Leviathan-hypothesis can be viewed as not 
convincingly corroborated in these cases. In sum, the tendency in tables 6 and 7 is rather to 
reject the Leviathan-hypothesis for Switzerland for these transmission channels.  
 
 
5   Conclusion 
 
Based on previous empirical evidence from the U.S, this paper started with the hypothesis that 
direct democracy might not be able to restrict the Leviathan-like behavior of bureaucracy for 
schooling issues. In particular, for the U.S. an increase in the administrative component of the 
school budget at the expense of its instructional component has been observed as a reaction to 
budget limits. In addition, larger class sizes appeared to be caused by the introduction of tax 
limits. 
 
Estimating a model of government expenditure using a panel of Swiss sub-federal school 
expenditure and student-teacher ratios, however, no such behavior of the Swiss school 
bureaucracy can be detected. In contrast, the impact of direct legislation on the ratio of 
instructional to administrative spending of current expenses rather appear to indicate 
efficiency gains in the provision of public schooling in Switzerland. This result contradicts 
  20expectations which have been developed before, but corroborates previous empirical findings 
on the provision of public goods by Swiss cantons and communes. 
 
As explanation for these contrasting estimation outcomes, it might be that the initiative-
induced tax limit in the U.S. and the institutions of direct democracy in Switzerland are not 
fully comparable institutions. Furthermore, it is also possible that differences in model 
specification drive the empirical results. Finally, unobserved cultural, political or institutional 
factors might also lead to this variation in outcome. These open questions call for future 
research on this issue. 
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Table A1: Description of Variables 
Variable Description  Source 
    
Dependent Variable    
    
Current or Investment School 














Professional schools (Sec II)  Num ers / number of students in  BFS 
 
  
Pre-School  Cantonal and Communal Educational 
nditure category 200 / cantonal 
lation aged 1 – 4 years 
BFS 
Primary School  Category 210 / population aged 5 – 9 years  BFS 
Secondary I school  Categories 211 – 213 / population aged 10 – 
ars 
BFS 
Professional school  
II) 
Categories 230 - 233, 239, / population aged 
19 years 
BFS 
High school (Sec II)  Category 250 / population aged 15 – 19 
 
BFS 
Professional school (Tertiary)  Categories 260 – 263, 269 / population aged 
24 years 
BFS 
Cantonal University (Tertiary)  Category 271 / population aged 20 – 24 
 
BFS 
Adult education  Category 292 / population aged 20 – 24 
 
BFS 
School Administration  Category 290 / population aged 1 – 24 years  BFS 
    
Class Size 1999-2002    
Primary School  Class size in primary schools  BFS 
Secondary I School  Class size in secondary I schools  BFS 
Sec II Middle School 
loma) 
Class size in secondary II schools leading to 
loma 
BFS 
Sec II Middle School 
e) 
Class size in secondary II schools with a 
 on commerce and trade 
BFS 
Sec II high school  
urity) 
Class size in secondary II schools leading to 
rsity admission (high school) 
BFS 
    
Student-teacher ratio 1999-   
Compulsory education.  Number of teachers / number of students in 
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Table A1: Description of Variables (cont.) 
Variable Description  Source 
Independent Variables    
    
Direct democracy   Index from 1 (minimum) to 6 
(maximum) 
Own calculations /  
STUTZER (1999) 
Fiscal decentralization  1-(cantonal total expenditure 
/cantonal + local expenditure) 
Own calculations, BFS 
Tax competition  Tax competition for canton i = [Sum 
(tax(j)* inverse distance (ij)) ]/ 
25 
Own calculations, FTA 
Constitutional constraint  Index from 1 to 4 (strictest)  G. KIRCHGÄSSNER 
Size of coalition  Number of parties in government  Own calculations based on 
issues of Année 
Politique Suisse 
Conservative ideology  Share of rightist parties in executive 
– share of leftist parties 
Own calculations based on 
issues of Année 
Politique Suisse 
Federal transfers  Log (deflated federal transfers / 
population) 
BFS, SECO (deflator) 
High education  Persons above 15 holding a High 
school degree or higher / total 
population > 15 years 
Values available for 1990 and 
2000. Values for the 
years 1994 – 1997 are 
averages of both. 
Volkszählung 




Income  Log(deflated national income in a 
canton in 1000 Sfr/ population) 
BFS; 
Cantonal population  Log(permanent residential 




Residents 0 – 20 years  Residents aged 0 – 20 years / 
residential population 
BFS 
Residents over 60 years  Residents aged over 60 years / 
residential population 
BFS 
Latin  Canton with either Italian or French 





                                                 
18 The BFS defines permanent residents as Swiss people and foreigners holding a C- or B-permit. Seasonally 
admitted residents are excluded. 
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